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THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statutory Framework
The National School Lunch Program' provides thousands of free
or reduced-cost meals daily to needy children across the country.
Originating during the Depression as an informal arrangement to utilize
the nation's schoolchildren 2 as consumers of surplus farm products,3
the program was designed primarily to dissipate the glut in the agricul-
tural markets. After World War II, selective service investigation of
draftee rejections revealed a significant correlation between physical
deficiencies and childhood malnutrition,4 highlighting the program's
nutritional benefits. Congress then enacted the National School Lunch
Act ' of 1946.
Under the Act, the Department of Agriculture continued to admin-
ister the program.6 The Act also retained provisions for the purchase
of surplus agricultural commodities and codified and regularized direct
'42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-60 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-61 (Supp. V,
1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, §§ 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9,
84 Stat. 208-13.
2 The Act applies to all nonprofit schools, both public and private. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1760(d) (7) (1964).
3 The Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. § 612c (1964), reserves
30% of gross customs receipts for use by the Secretary of Agriculture to promote
domestic consumption of farm products. Portions of these funds are available for
school meal programs.
During the Depression, the Works Progress Administration and the National
Youth Administration purchased surplus commodities and distributed them to im-
poverished persons. Wartime demand eliminated most of the agricultural surolus,
and transportation shortages made deliveries of government-purchased commodities
uncertain. The Government then resorted to direct indemnification of schools for
food purchases. See S. REP. No. 553, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1945) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 553].
4 See H.R. REP. No. 684, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 684]; S. REP. No. 553, at 9; 92 CoNG. REc. 1466 (1946) (remarks of
Representative Cannon).
5 Ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230 (1946).
6The Act is still administered by the Department of Agriculture. In August
1969, the School Lunch Program became the responsibility of the Food and Nutrition
Service of the Department, but rules, regulations, licenses, and approvals were un-
affected by this shift. 34 Fed. Reg. 13119 (1969).
The White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health urged the transfer
of all food programs from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1969, at 14, col. 4, but this
change has not been effected.
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wartime appropriations to state school agencies for the purchase of non-
surplus, nutritionally qualified foods. During the ensuing decade, the
statute was erratically funded and indifferently administered. But in
the early 1960's, as popular and governmental concern for the victims
of poverty and hunger increased,' the Act's potential usefulness became
evident-it could provide needy schoolchildren with at least one nutri-
tionally adequate meal per day.
In 1962, the Act's original cash allocation mechanism, formulated
according to the state's per capita income and number of school-age
children, was restructured. Based upon state per capita income and
rate of child participation in the various lunch programs," the new
formula rewarded states which had demonstrated a readiness to develop
and promote lunch programs.
Section 1759a,' ° also added in 1962, gave special assistance to
participating schools drawing students from poverty areas to enable
them to provide significantly larger numbers of needy children with a
free or reduced-price meal. This assistance was also designed to re-
lieve the poorest schools of the difficult task of allocating a limited
number of meals among a larger number of equally needy children.
The 1962 amendments heralded the beginning of a shift in con-
gressional focus from the economic hardships caused by the agricultural
surplus to the problems of poverty and hunger. The Food Stamp Act
of 1964 " and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 12 marked stages of the
7See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1753, 1756, 1757 (1964).
8 See, e.g., M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AmERICA (1962).
942 U.S.C. § 1753 (1964); see S. REP. No. 2016, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 2016]. The federal matching grant formulas are
discussed at text accompanying notes 17-20 infra.
1042 U.S.C. § 1759a (1964), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-248, § 7, 84 Stat. 211-12. Section 1759a established a formula for disbursing
special funds to especially needy schools. The formula was based upon the number
of free or reduced-price lunches served in the state during the preceding year. Con-
gress revised this formula in 1970 to allocate funds according to the ratio of the
number of children in the state between the ages of 3 and 17 whose families have
incomes of less than $4,000 per year to the number of such children nationally.
Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 7, 84 Stat. 211-12.
117 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1964). The Food Stamp program authorizes the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to provide needy families with coupons redeemable for food.
Id. § 2013. The eligible family purchases the stamps for an amount equivalent to its
usual, prestamp expenditure for food, id. §2016(b), but the stamps may be redeemed
for a larger quantity of food at a participating retail store. Id. § 2013(a).
1242 U.S.C. § 1771-85 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-248, §§2, 5, 8, 10, 84 Stat. 207, 210, 212-13, 214. The Child Nutrition
Act provides funds to nonprofit day-care centers for an experimental breakfast pro-
gram for children attending schools in areas with a high proportion of working
mothers. The Act also provides funds for a special milk program. President Nixon
has advocated the abolition of the milk program because its beneficiaries are pri-
marily white, middle class children. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1970, at 14, col. 3. The
program has been challenged in the courts for precisely this reason. See San Benito
County Consumers' Cooperative v. Hardin, Civil No. C-69-492 (N.D. Cal., filed
Dec. 2, 1969).
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shift. The enactment of the Vanik Program '" in 1968 as a part of the
National School Lunch Act completed the transition.14 Although still
intended to supply a market for farm surplus commodities, the National
School Lunch Act now also reflects a strong concern with the nutritional
problems of impoverished schoolchildren.
From the Act's inception, state and federal governments have
shared responsibility for its administration and funding. Federal guide-
lines lodge significant discretion in the hands of local and state authori-
ties, subject only to initial federal approval and periodic review.15
School district as well as state participation is entirely optional, and
withdrawal from the program, although politically inexpedient, is
largely unrestrained. 6
Receipt of federal funds is conditioned upon disbursement of three
state dollars for every federal dollar contributed.' The federal money
available in any fiscal year for a particular state's use depends in part
upon the number of meals served under the program in that state. That
number-the state's participation rate-is multiplied by the state's as-
sistance need rate, a figure based upon the state's per capita income.'
For each state with a per capita income equal to or in excess of the
average for all states, the assistance need rate is five. For states with
an annual per capita income below the national average, the need rate
increases from five to a ceiling of nine-the poorest states have need
rates closest to nine.' 9 The product of the assistance need rate and the
participation rate coefficients is an index for that particular state. Each
state shares the federal funds appropriated in the same proportion as its
index bears to the sum of the indices for all states.
20
13 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970. Pub. L.
No. 91-248, §§ 6(c), (d), 84 Stat. 210. The Vanik Program authorizes expenditure
of funds to assist nonprofit service institutions, such as day-care centers, settlement
houses, or recreation centers, in establishing and maintaining nonprofit food service
programs.
14 The 1970 amendments to the National School Lunch Act reaffirmed congres-
sional concern with the relationship between poverty and malnutrition. See Act of
May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 7, 84 Stat. 211-12.
15See 42 U.S.C. § 1760 (1964).
16 Los Angeles is the program's most prominent dropout. Presently maintaining
its own program, the city withdrew in 1955 when the federal per-meal subsidy was
reduced from the statutory maximum of 90 to 4.30. Independent charitable organiza-
tions provide a limited number of free lunches for the city. COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL
LUNcH PARTICIPATION, THEIR DAILY BREAD 114-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
THEIR DAILY BREAD].
1742 U.S.C. §1756 (1964), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
248, §4, 84 Stat. 209-10.
1842 U.S.C. § 1753 (1964).
19 Id. § 1760; 7 C.F.R. § 210.2 (1970).
20The following example illustrates the allocation process:
Assume that the nation is divided into two states, A and B, of equal population;
that the national per capita income is $6,000 per year; and that each state served
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Federal funds are intended to cover only the costs of food and cer-
tain nonfood and administrative expenses,2 and may not be applied to
the cost of any building expansion, land acquisition, or rent for build-
ings necessary to furnish food service.22 State or local funds must pay
for those facilities.
The heavy burdens imposed upon the states by these limitations
on the use of federal money and by the matching requirements of the
Act have been shifted to local, participating school districts; only twelve
states currently bear any portion of the Program's costs.' State edu-
cational agencies and personnel act chiefly in administrative and super-
visory capacities as liaisons between the local and federal levels,2" de-
termining both initial and continuing eligibility of local units 25 and
1-million lunches under the program during the past year. State A has a per capita
income of $8,000; state B, $4,000. The share of each state is determined by the
following formula:
(assistance need rate) (participation rate) = I.
Where I. is the index figure for state s.
S. = I./I
Where S, is the share of state s in the federal funds and I is the sum of the index
figures for all the states.
Applying that formula to states A and B:
Assistance need rate (42 U.S.C. § 1760(c) (1964))
State A: 5





State A: 1a = (assistance need rate) (participation rate) _ 5(1,000,000) =
5,000,000
State B: Ib = 7.5(1,000,000) = 7,500,000
Share:
State A: S, = I./(Ia + Ib) = 5,000,000/(5,000,000 + 7,500,000) =
5,000,000/12,500,000 = 0.4
State B: Sb = 7,500,000/(5,000,000 + 7,500,000) = 7,500,000/12,500,000 = 0.6
Thus, state B would receive 60% and state A would receive 40% of the total federal
appropriation.
21 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1754-55 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970), as amended,
Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 3, 84 Stat. 209.
22
See 7 C.F.R. §210.7(b) (1970). In 1962, an amendment was proposed to
extend the program to urban schools unable to participate because of inadequate
facilities, but a study program to develop methods of furnishing meals to such schools
was substituted for the amendment. S. REP. No. 2016, at 11.
23 Hearings on H.R. 515 and H.R. 516 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1969). During the 1968-69 school year in Boston,
children paid 70% of the program's costs, the federal government 22%, and the city
8%. Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295, 298 (D. Mass. 1969). The 1970 amend-
ments require the state to bear a portion of the cost from revenue sources other than
funds derived from the program, but the state's required contribution will be relatively
small-only 10% by 1977. Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 4, 84 Stat.
209-10.
24See 42 U.S.C. § 1757 (1964).
25 7 C.F.R. § 210.13 (1970).
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executing the participation agreements with the Department of Agri-
culture." Thus the local school districts are responsible for financing
and administering the bulk of the program. But because participating
districts rely mainly on pupil contributions to defray expenses, the
pupils themselves actually finance the state's portion of the program's
costs.
Federal aid to participating schools reimburses them for expendi-
tures made in connection with the program to a maximum level of nine
cents per meal,28 although the federal contribution has remained well
below the maximum in recent years. 29 The average cost to assemble,
prepare, and serve each meal is approximately fifty-seven to sixty
cents,30 but schools rarely charge the full cost to any pupil, regardless
of ability to pay. A lunch is ordinarily priced between thirty-five and
forty-five cents; the higher prices are charged in secondary schools,
which generally serve larger portions.3
The heart of this complex administrative scheme is section 1758,
which requires that participating institutions serve free or reduced-cost
lunches to children determined "by local school authorities to be unable
to pay the full cost" of the meal.32 The loosely drawn federal standards
of eligibility are only advisory: local authorities have broad discretion
to determine who is eligible, 3 although the Act does require that a child
receiving a free lunch may not be treated differently from his paying
schoolmates.34
But the local emphasis of the program is not always compatible
with the Act's purpose of providing nutritious, free lunches to needy
children. Schools without proper food preparation facilities, even in
participating school districts, are commonly excluded from the pro-
26 Id. § 210.3 (c).
27 See note 23 .mpra.
287 C.F.R. §210.10(b) (1970). The 9 maximum applies to type A lunches,
the basic meal served by most schools. Section 1759a provides for special assistance
to poorer schools, and the regulations promulgated thereunder allow a maximum of
20?for a type A meal. Id. §210.10(c).
29 R. Leonard, Why Child Nutrition Programs Fail 48, Dec. 3, 1969 (report for
the Children's Foundation).
30 Id. 49.
31 See, e.g., Complaint at 13, Kennedy v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 33367
(E.D. Mich., filed Aug. 26, 1969).
3242 U.S.C. § 1758 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-248, §§ 6(a), (b), (d), (e), 84 Stat. 210-11.
38 Children from families on AFDC or from households receiving welfare benefits
through local programs are considered automatically eligible, 33 Fed. Reg. 15675
(1968), and the state educational agency must compel local school authorities to issue
written policy statements of criteria to determine eligibility, see Act of May 14, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 6, 84 Stat. 210-11. Other than these specific limitations, few
additional controls circumscribe local discretion.
3442 U.S.C. § 1758 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-248, § 6(d), 84 Stat. 210.
NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
gram's benefits unless supplied with lunches prepared elsewhere.3 .5
Originally constructed as "neighborhood" schools, older, urban schools
lack the lunchrooms or cafeterias of their newer, suburban counterparts.
Theoretically, students at such neighborhood schools are able to return
home for a noon meal, but this assumes that the child returns to a house-
hold able to provide him with a nutritious meal, an assumption indeed
questionable in many ghetto areas. 36  Further, the chronic economic
problems besetting most urban areas have resulted in significant reduc-
tions in expenditures for all school building programs, including the
addition of cafeteria facilities to existing school buildings. Tight money,
the high cost of land, and the unavailability of federal funds all con-
tribute to the reluctance of local authorities to furnish lunchrooms in
present schools and sometimes even in new school buildings. Conse-
quently, those children whom the school lunch program is intended to
benefit most directly are frequently denied its assistance. These and
other apparent inequities in the program have produced a number of
suits, most of which are currently pending in the federal courts. 7 A
brief examination of one adjudicated case will indicate some of the legal
problems presented.
B. Briggs v. Kerrigan
Briggs v. Kerrigan 38 arose in the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts as an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to com-
pel federal, state, and local administrators of the school lunch program
to make lunches available to impoverished Boston elementary school
pupils represented by the plaintiffs.3 9 Although the city participated in
the program, plaintiffs all attended schools which lacked lunchrooms or
cafeterias and consequently were unable to join in the program.4 0
Plaintiffs challenged the administration of the system on statutory 41
and constitutional 42 grounds.
35 Of any major city, New York City supplies the highest proportion of its
pupils with free lunches and also bears a substantial share of the cost. All meals
are prepared at a central kitchen on Long Island and trucked to schools within the
five boroughs. THEm DAILY BREAD 71-74.
36 Hearings on S. Res. 281 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower,
& Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
145 (1968) ; Hearings on Malnutrition & Federal Food Service Programs Before the
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
3 7 See, e.g., Stogner v. Page, Civil No. 69-C1338 (N.D. Ill., filed June 30, 1969);
Walker v. School Bd. of Kansas City, Kansas School Dist. No. 500, Civil No. -
(D. Kan., filed 1969); Kennedy v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 33367 (E.D.
Mich., filed Au-. 26, 1969). Marquez v. Hardin, CCH Pov. L. REP. f" 10,393 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 5, 1969) has been incompletely adjudicated.
38 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969).
39 Complaint at 2, Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969) [here-
inafter cited as Briggs Complaint].
40 307 F. Supp. at 299.
41 Briggs Complaint 8-9.
42Id. 8.
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Arguing that the Act established a priority in favor of nutritionally
and economically deprived children, the plaintiffs read the Act to re-
quire that this priority apply throughout the participating school dis-
trict.3 The defendants' failure to make meals available at the poorer,
inadequately equipped schools violated the Act and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants'
administration of the Act-because not rationally related to the Act's
purpose-also violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.4" The resulting discrimination against the poorer students
was unconstitutional.
After an extended discussion of the Act's provisions and legislative
history, the court rejected both arguments. Any statutory priority of
the Act in favor of poor children applied only to children in the par-
ticipating school, not in the participating school system. 5 Under this
view of the statute, the Boston school system met the requirements of
section 1758 and related provisions of the Act. The court also found
that proper consideration of the legislative purposes did not support
plaintiffs' contentions: the statute was intended to create a market for
surplus agricultural commodities as well as to provide nutritious meals
to both rich and poor schoolchildren.46 Congress would have more
clearly expressed any priority favoring participation by poor schools.47
The court also denied plaintiffs' constitutional claim. Exclusion
of schools without cafeterias or lunchrooms did not unreasonably classify
plaintiffs, for it did not implement a pattern of segregation according
to wealth, but reflected a proper legislative allocation of resources.48
This Comment will consider the constitutional and statutory issues
raised by nonprovision in a participating school and by nonparticipation
of a school within a participating district.
I. NONPROVISION IN THE PARTICIPATING SCHOOL
Secton 1758 requires schools participating in the National School
Lunch Program to supply free or reduced-cost meals to all eligible
children. Local school or welfare officials must determine eligibility
requirements and must develop a policy statement setting forth the
criteria for eligibility.
[A]s a minimum, [such criteria] shall include the level of
family income, including welfare grants, the number in the
4 3 Id. 8-9.
44Id. 8.
45307 F. Supp. at 301.
46 Id. at 300.
47M. at 301.
48 Id. at 302-03.
NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
family unit, and the number of children in the family unit at-
tending school or service institutions .... 49
In administering the program, however, schools commonly set a
single, reduced price for each meal served, regardless of the individual's
ability to pay, and the neediest children may be unable to pay this
price."° Even if the school dispenses free lunches to the poorest pupils,
the number of '.'eligible" children may exceed the number of available
free lunches. Children unable to pay the lunch price must either go
without lunch or accept a free lunch according to some method of
rotation among the eligible children. 1 But the failure of a participating
school to provide a free lunch to an eligible child clearly violates the
provisions of the Act.52
The issue of nonprovision in a participating school was central to
the district court's decision in Shaw v. Governing Board of the Modesto
City School District.53  The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the implemen-
tation of the school district's free lunch eligibility standards because
the standards were based upon the district's financial resources rather
than upon a child's ability to pay for a lunch. The court held that the
Act required defendants to determine eligibility according to the need
of the child without regard to the district's cost. If the resulting cost
exceeded the federal grant, the district could pay the deficit from its
general funds, raise the price of the meals to paying students, or employ
some combination of those two methods.5" Each of these solutions
presents problems, however.
The cost of free lunches to a school is most likely to exceed the
federal funds contributed in schools with a high proportion of eligible
children. Often situated in lower income areas where property values
are low to moderate, such schools lack sufficient reserve funds to make
up the deficiency in the program budget. In addition, taxpayers in such
areas would probably be unable to increase property taxes sufficiently
to raise the necessary money. By definition, families in such a neigh-
borhood are relatively poor and would be hard pressed to bear addi-
tional financial burdens. The economic condition of the area also makes
futile increasing the price of the lunches to the paying students. Be-
cause most students would be eligible for the free lunches, the few re-
maining students would face rather substantial price increases to offset
49 Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 6(b), 84 Stat. 210.
See Complaint at 5, Marquez v. Hardin, Civil No. 51446 (N.D. Cal., filed
June 5, 1969).
51 Hearings on Malnutrition, supra note 36.
6
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1758 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-248, §§ 6(a), (b), (d), (e), 84 Stat. 210-11.
53310 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
Id. at 1285.
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the cost of the free lunches. But even the paying students are likely to
be unable to sustain a significant cost increase. Consequently, they
would be compelled to find alternative sources of supply. As these con-
sumers leave the program and the demand for lunches decreases, the
total revenue available to subsidize the free lunches will also decrease.
Clearly, the poor school's search for funds to pay for free lunches will
be difficult. If the school finds itself unable to overcome the deficit re-
sulting from an insufficient federal grant and thus unable to comply
with the statute, it must withdraw from the program.55
The practical problems raised by nonprovision in the participating
school do not lend themselves to judicial resolution. Increased federal
and state contributions to the school lunch program are essential to an
adequate solution.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE NONPARTICIPATING SCHOOL
IN THE PARTICIPATING SCHOOL DISTRICT
The failure of a participating school to provide a free lunch to a
needy, eligible child clearly violates the Act.5" But a school electing
not to participate in the program denies a meal to a potentially eligible
child without violating the statutory mandate, for participation is purely
voluntary. Although perhaps appropriate when each school functions
autonomously, this result is more difficult to justify when the decision
to participate is made for an individual school by a central authority
such as a district school board.
To minimize its total expenditures while benefiting from the pro-
gram, a district containing both a school serving a relatively wealthy
area and a school situated in a poorer area might implement the pro-
gram only at the wealthier school. In that school, the majority of the
program's costs would be absorbed by pupil contributions from paying
students, 7 but in the poorer school the contributions of the paying
students would be insufficient to pay for the larger number of free
lunches distributed. The poorer school might also lack the facilities
necessary to prepare and distribute lunches.5" Although the district
might elect to utilize student contributions from both schools to offset
the cost of all free lunches supplied to schoolchildren in the school sys-
tem, the statute does not compel that approach.
Relevant in any equal protection analysis are the nature of the
individual or group interest involved, the status of the complainants, the
55 See id. at 1286. Under the Shaw rationale, a school would probably be unable
to adjust its determination of need to the size of the federal grant.
56 See Shaw v. Governing Bd. of Modesto City School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1282
(E.D. Cal. 1970).
57 See note 23 supra; text accompanying note 27 supra.
68See Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969).
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effect of the challenged classification on the complainants, and the
reasonableness of the official action in light of its purposes. Depending
chiefly upon the interest at stake and upon the challenged classification,
one of two standards of review will be utilized by the reviewing court.5 9
The court will either consider the legitimacy of the legislative purpose
and the rationality of the method chosen to achieve that purpose (re-
strained review) 6 or, if the interest affected is "fundamental" 61 or the
classification "suspect," 62 search for some "compelling state interest" 6
to justify the discriminatory classification (active review)."
A. Restrained Review: The Case for a Priority for the Poor
A reaction to a period of active Supreme Court review of economic
regulations, restrained review accords considerable deference to legis-
lative judgments and is useful primarily in cases involving economic
regulation 65 or similar use of the police power.65 Restrained review
analyzes an equal protection argument in terms of the purpose of a
particular state action and the reasonableness of the means chosen to
achieve that purpose. If the method chosen to achieve a legitimate state
purpose is reasonable, a court will sustain a challenged classification
despite its allegedly discriminatory effect and despite the availability of
alternative classifications which would effectuate the state's purpose. 7
r9 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1076-
1132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Equal Protection].
60 See id. 1077-87.
61 Fundamental interests include access to the criminal appellate process, Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966), and the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
62 Suspect criteria include classifications drawn according to race, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), lineage, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), possibly alienage, see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948), and perhaps wealth, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Wealth has been treated as suspect only when a fundamental interest is involved.
See Developments-Equal Protection 1124. See generally Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 22-35 (1969).
03 See Developments-Equal Protection 1087-1132.
64 Id. 1087.
65 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) ; Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
66 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346
U.S. 545 (1954); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) ; Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947).
67See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1940). But see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-97
(1965).
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Here the state's purpose is to provide meals under the National
School Lunch Act. To challenge successfully the present administra-
tion of the school lunch program, plaintiffs must show that their in-
ability to obtain a free meal because their school does not participate in
the program is contrary to the Act's primary purpose.6 If the Act
accords priority to feeding poor schoolchildren per se (and not simply
to poor children attending a participating school), administrative action
denying those children free lunches while permitting more affluent
pupils to participate in the program is open to challenge as irrational.
But neither the Act's language nor its legislative history evidences
an intent to favor poorer students regardless whether they attend par-
ticipating or nonparticipating schools. 9 The purposes of the Act 70 are
to provide schoolchildren "' in participating schools with a nutritionally
adequate noon meal and to provide farmers with consumers of surplus
agricultural commodities.72
These purposes are inextricably entwined." Congressional reports
issued shortly before the passage of the Act manifest an acute concern
with remedying nutritional deficiencies in children, a concern motivated
in part by the high proportion of draftee rejections traceable to poor
childhood nutrition.7 But this concern embraces children of all eco-
nomic strata who may receive nutritionally inadequate meals at home,
not merely poor children. Further, the Act's objective of creating a
viable market for surplus produce is best obtained through broad eco-
nomic support and wide participation by pupils contributing financially
68 Plaintiffs would be unlikely to challenge the Act's constitutionality. A declara-
tion that the Act was unconstitutional would certainly not secure to impoverished
pupils the benefits of the program.
69 The 1970 amendments to the Act discuss a priority for needy children:
In providing meals free or at reduced cost to needy children, first priority
shall be given to providing free meals to the neediest children.
Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-248, § 6(b), 84 Stat. 210 (emphasis added).
This provision only erects a priority favoring eligible, needy children in schools
voluntarily participating in the program. The problem of the nonparticipating school
in the participating district remains unresolved.
7 0 See 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1964).
71 The term "schoolchildren" is used broadly. Congress was primarily concerned
with assisting children transported great distances to school or who had working
mothers, and neither of these burdens is unique to poor children. See H.R. REP.
No. 684, supra note 4, at 2.
72 See id. 3. Congress apparently did not perceive the relationship between low
income and insufficient consumption of costly, nutritious foods. See S. REP. No. 553,
supra note 3, at 9. This lack of perceptivity still persists, see HousE CoMM. ON
AGRICULTURE, 90TH CONG., 2D SESs., HUNGER STUDY AND HUNGER STUDY SUPPLE-
MENT (Comm. Print 1968), despite forceful empirical studies demonstrating that
poverty is the most important impediment to a proper diet. See CITIZENS' BD. OF
INQUIRY INTO HUNGER & MALNUTRITION IN THE UNITED STATES, HUNGER, U.S.A.
(1968).
7 3 See S. REP. No. 553, supra note 3, at 8-9, 12.
74 Sources cited note 4 supra.
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to the program. A priority favoring poor children would require the
use of a greater percentage of appropriated funds to supply free lunches,
resulting in less money being spent to purchase agricultural com-
modities.
75
The statutory mechanism for implementing the program also indi-
cates that the Act does not establish an unqualified priority favoring
poor children, for the emphasis is on local control, leaving to the in-
dividual school the choice whether or not to participate. Poor children
have an explicit statutory remedy 71 only if denied a free lunch in a
participating school.77
The debates on the bill which became the National School
Lunch Act do not suggest a priority for the poor. Congress focused
almost exclusively on fears of governmental extravagance in a period
of post-war dislocation, 78 on potential, undesirable increases in the
federal bureaucracy,79 and on fears of eventual federal control of
the public schools." References to the poor were periph-
eral,8 and mention of a priority absent.
Legislative activity in the 1960's further undercuts the argument
for an across-the-board priority in favor of the poor. Although the
Child Nutrition Act of 1966 explicitly provided that first consideration
be accorded to economically deprived areas,82 Congress made no similar
change in the provisions of the National School Lunch Act and no
Department of Agriculture regulation has attempted to implement such
a policy.
Assuming that the Act does not embrace a priority favoring all
poor children, a school district may deny free lunches to impoverished
75 See Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295, 300 (D. Mass. 1969).
76 42 U.S.C. § 1758 (Supp. V, 1970), as amended, Act of May 14, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-248, §§6(a), (b), (d), (e), 84 Stat. 210-11.
77 Some ambiguity inheres in the term "school" for the purposes of the Act.
Although defined in the statute to include only individual attendance units, see 42
U.S.C. § 1760(d) (7) (1964), the regulations promulgated under the Act employ the
terms "school" and "attendance unit" in distinct contexts. See 7 C.F.R. §§2102
(c-i), (in) (1970). Assuming "attendance unit" represents the smaller unit, plaintiffs
in Briggs alleged that "school" meant "school district" as used in the Act. Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 7-9,
Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969). Although admittedly per-
plexed by the apparent discrepancy, the Briggs court utilized the statutory definitions.
307 F. Supp. at 301.
78See, e.g., 92 CONG. REc. 1451 (1946) (remarks of Representative Arends) ; id.
1459-60 (remarks of Representative Clevenger).
79 See id. 1466-67 (remarks of Representative Gwynne).
8oSee id. 1476 (remarks of Representative Smith) ; id. 1505 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Sumners); id. 1461 (remarks of Representative Wadsworth); id. 1465
(remarks of Representative Taber).
81 See id. 1453 (remarks of Representative Sabath) ; id. 1458 (remarks of
Representative Hall) ; id. 1471 (remarks of Representative Voorhis). But see id.
1468 (remarks of Representative Holifield) ; id. 1469 (remarks of Representative
Biemiller) ; id. 1494 (remarks of Representative Powell).
8242 U.S.C. § 1773(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
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pupils in a nonparticipating school. This denial is reasonably calculated
to implement the congressional purpose; the school district simply re-
sponds to the omnipresent problem of economic scarcity. Thus, unless
the local administrators intentionally discriminate in implementing the
Act, 3 a school district's failure to provide lunches to all potentially
eligible children will probably not be held unconstitutional under the
restrained review standard.
B. Active Review: Fundamental Interests and the Nutritionally
Adequate Meal
Active judicial review in fourteenth amendment cases has devel-
oped along two distinct lines. Active review is appropriate when the
state statutory or administrative actions are apparently based upon
classifications viewed as inherently suspect,84 such as race, 5 or upon
classifications abridging certain fundamental interests."0 Because classi-
fications based upon wealth-like those resulting from the administra-
tion of the school lunch program-have never been clearly recognized
as sufficiently questionable to permit active review," examination of the
equal protection problems posed by the nonparticipating school in the
participating district is most useful if based upon consideration of
fundamental interests abridged by a classification based upon wealth. 8
Here too, however, the argument is not at all promising.
8 3 See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Developments-Equal Protection 1085.
84 See generally Developments-Equal Protection 1087-1120.
85 See id. 1087-91.
8 6 See generally id. 1120-23. The decisions employing active review focus on a
narrow group of fundamental interests, see note 61 supra, but unfortunately fail
to articulate a comprehensive or consistent theory explaining what interests will
or will not be deemed fundamental. See Developments-Equal Protection 1130.
See also Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966). Despite
the apparent lack of objectivity in deciding which interests are sufficiently critical to
trigger active review, interests closely related to those presently deemed fundamental
(and probably only those interests) are likely to achieve the necessary status to
require active review. Cf. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. Rtv. 60,
97-102 (1967) ; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 S. CT. REv. 39, 57 (1967).
87See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd Per curiam
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
88 Classifications based upon wealth have been challenged most successfully when
fundamental interests are infringed. See sources cited note 62 supra. Thus, a criminal
defendant's inability to purchase a transcript abridged his fundamental interest in a
criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the inability to pay a poll
tax denied a citizen his right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966), and the inability to receive welfare benefits until a residency require-
ment was satisfied restricted the right to travel freely, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
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Assuming that poor schoolchildren have no fundamental legal in-
terest in securing a nutritious meal, 9 active review is inappropriate to
assess the administration of the Act unless a free lunch can be deemed
essential for a poor student to enjoy a fundamental interest. ° Never
expressly recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental, equal edu-
cational opportunity hovers unsettlingly on the borderline between
fundamental and other interests.9 ' Arguably, the provision of a free
lunch to a needy child is necessary for him to obtain an equal educa-
tional opportunity, for a hungry child cannot benefit from the instruc-
tion offered by his school. 2
The doctrine of equal educational opportunity emerged from the
dicta of Brown v. Board of Education,93 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1954. Since then, similar dicta have appeared in other cases domi-
nated by the racial element. Judicial scrutiny has frequently extended
beyond simple condemnation of racial classifications to an analysis of
the impact of the alleged discrimination upon poor children, both black
and white.94 In Hobson v. Hansen,95 Judge J. Skelly Wright strongly
89 Such an interest might evolve from a judicial recognition of a right to life or
similar interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (dictum).
90 This reasoning is analogous to that implicit in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), in which the Supreme Court held that a state statute providing full appellate
review of criminal convictions only upon presentation of a transcript which must be
paid for by the appellant violated the equal protection clause when the requirement
effectively denied full appellate review to the indigent. The "fundamental interest"
protected was not an indigent's right to a transcript, but rather the right not to
have his guilt or innocence be determined by his economic status. See id. at 19
("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts."). Although a
poor schoolchild has no fundamental legal interest in securing a free lunch, the equal
protection clause may nonetheless preclude a school district from distributing lunches
under the National School Lunch Act in a manner impairing the ability of a poor
schoolchild to exercise a recognized fundamental interest.
91 See Michelman, supra note 62, at 28, 48-52; Developments-Equal Protection
1129, 1190; Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1513, 1524 (1968). But see Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175, 196-97 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Kurland, Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cxi. L. REV.
583 (1968). See generally Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:
A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. Rv.
305 (1969); Shanks, Equal Education and the Law, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 255,
263 (1970) ; Note, Discrintinations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HARv. L. REv. 435, 452-53 (1967).
92 Food is unique in that an adequate amount of it in childhood is essential
for the future health of the individual. It is a fundamental requirement,
unlike any other need. Without adequate nutrition the most carefully devised
educational system will be ineffective.
S. REPt. No. 553, supra note 3, at 12; see H.t. REP. No. 684, stpra note 4, at 2.
93 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
94See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218. 229-32 (1964); Hall v. St.
Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 656 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S.
515 (1962).
95 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
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criticized the District of Columbia school system, asserting that educa-
tional opportunities should not be qualified by either race or poverty.
Both conditions produced equally detrimental effects which the District
had the duty to remedy. 6 Despite its rather broad language, however,
Hobson was primarily concerned with a system of de jure racial classi-
fication; racial overtones pervaded much of the court's discussion of the
school system's impact on the poor.
A more recent case dealt explicitly with the issue of equal educa-
tional opportunity. In McInnis v. Shapiro,9 a three-judge district
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Constitution compelled
recognition of an equal educational opportunity. The plaintiffs in
Mclnnis were schoolchildren living in urban ghettos and attending
schools which spent far less per pupil than more affluent schools through-
out the state. They contended that the state statutes permitting this
wide variation in educational expenditures unconstitutionally denied
them equal protection of the laws, and sought an injunction forbidding
distribution of funds under the statutes.9" The district court dismissed
the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
holding that the problem was essentially legislative and beyond the com-
petence of the judiciary 99 and that the Constitution did not require
states to allocate funds on the basis of the "educational needs" of
students. 0 0 The court's decision rested on its belief that no manageable
judicial standard could be devised to evaluate the constitutionality of
school funding statutes. The only possible standard, the court felt,
would require equal per pupil expenditures, an approach much too rigid
to deal with varying local problems and student needs. 10 ' The Supreme
Court affirmed this decision in a memorandum opinion.0 2 Although
the Court's action may only reflect its judgment that the issue was not
ripe for review,' judicial acceptance of a doctrine of equal educational
opportunity in the near future is improbable. And until the Court holds
that equal educational opportunity is a fundamental interest not to be
abridged by discriminatory classifications based upon wealth, plaintiffs
asserting a denial of equal protection because their school in a partici-
pating district does not provide them with free lunches are unlikely to
prevail.
96 Id. at 407, 493, 506.
97293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
98ld. at 329.
99 Id. at 335-36.
100 Id. at 331-35.
101 Id. at 335-36.
102 Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
103 See Shanks, supra note 91, at 264.
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The problems created by a constitutional requirement that free
lunches be distributed according to a uniform intradistrict standard re-
inforce judicial reluctance to hold the present administration of the
National School Lunch Act unconstitutional. The expansion of the
presently underfunded program would require substantial restructuring
of the entire administrative apparatus and would necessitate local gov-
ernment expenditures for new or improved cafeteria facilities to meet
the constitutional and statutory mandates. Rather than shoulder these
added burdens, a district might elect to withdraw entirely from the
program; in a period of inflation, tight money, and taxpayer revolt,
withdrawal might be politically feasible. Under current appropriation
levels, intradistrict uniformity would require drastic cutbacks in the
quality or quantity of lunches provided."0 4
CONCLUSION
The answer to the school lunch dilemma is likely to come from
legislative action rather than judicial intervention. Increasing funding
at all levels of government and a restructuring of the statutory scheme
to provide lunches first to needy children throughout a school district
would help eliminate some of the program's most pressing problems.
To remedy the deficiencies of the National School Lunch Act, this
Comment suggests greater federal participation in funding the program
and the adoption of the following amendments:
1. The second sentence of section 1757 of the Act is amended to
read: "Such disbursement to any school shall be made only for the
purposes of reimbursing it for the cost of obtaining agricultural com-
modities and other foods for consumption by children in the school
lunch program and nonfood assistance in connection with the program
or for the purpose of enabling any school to construct the cafeteria or
other facilities necessary to enable it to participate in the school lunch
program."
2. Section 1760(d) (7) is amended by striking out that paragraph
and substituting the following: "'School' means any public or non-
profit private school of high school grade or under, any school district
or similar entity controlling directly or indirectly one or more public
schools of high school grade or under and, with respect to Puerto Rico,
shall also include nonprofit child-care centers certified as such by the
Governor of Puerto Rico."
104 Although the regulations require food programs to meet certain nutritional
standards, 7 C.F.R. § 210.9 (1970), a school now providing meals exceeding that
minimum level might have to reduce the nutritional value of the meals to the
statutory minimum.
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The first amendment would authorize the expenditure of school
lunch funds for the construction of cafeterias, lunch rooms, or food
preparation facilities to enable presently nonparticipating schools to
enjoy the program's benefits. The second would amend the definition
of "school" to include school districts. Local school governing bodies
would be required to choose between participating entirely in the pro-
gram or not at all; if one school in the district participates, all schools
must. This would effectively establish a priority for needy children on
a districtwide basis.
Sheila A. Taenzler
